INTRODUCTION
The use, abuse, interpretations and reinterpretations of the notion of a P value has been a hot topic of controversy since the 1950s in statistics and several applied fields, including psychology, sociology, ecology, medicine, and economics.
The initial controversy between Fisher's significance testing and the Neyman and Pearson (N-P; 1933) hypothesis testing concerned the extent to which the pre-data Type I error probability a can address the arbitrariness and potential abuse of Fisher's post-data threshold for the P value. Fisher adopted a falsificationist stance and viewed the P value as an indicator of disagreement (inconsistency, contradiction) between data x 0 and the null hypothesis (H 0 ). Indeed, Fisher (1925:80) went as far as to claim that ''The actual value of p . . . indicates the strength of evidence against the hypothesis.'' Neyman's behavioristic interpretation of the pre-data Type I and II error probabilities precluded any evidential interpretation for the accept/reject the null (H 0 ) rules, insisting that accept (reject) H 0 does not connote the truth (falsity) of H 0 . The last exchange between these protagonists (Fisher 1955 , Pearson 1955 , Neyman 1956 ) did nothing to shed light on these issues. By the early 1960s, it was clear that neither account of frequentist testing provided an adequate answer to the question (Mayo 1996) : When do data x 0 provide evidence for or against a hypothesis H?
The primary aim of this paper is to revisit several charges, interpretations, and comparisons of the P value with other procedures as they relate to their primary aims and objectives, the nature of the questions posed to the data, and the nature of their underlying reasoning and the ensuing inferences. The idea is to shed light on some of these issues using the error-statistical perspective; see Mayo and Spanos (2011) .
FREQUENTIST TESTING AND ERROR PROBABILITIES
In an attempt to minimize technicalities but be precise about the concepts needed, the discussion will focus on the hypotheses
in the context of the simple Normal model X t ; NIID(l, r 2 ), t ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n, . . . , where NIID stands for normal, independent, and identically distributed.
Fisher vs. Neyman-Pearson (N-P) approaches
In the case of the above null hypothesis, Fisher's significance and the Neyman-Pearson (N-P) hypothesis testing revolve around the test statistic
where St(n À 1) denotes a Student's t distribution with (n À 1) degrees of freedom, and
Fisher's significance testing ignores the alternative hypothesis in Eq. 1 and uses Eq. 2 to evaluate the P (Fisher 1955) . The subsequent literature, however, did extend the interpretation of P values to allow for large enough values to be viewed as moderate to no evidence against H 0 ; see Murtaugh (2013) . The same sampling distribution (Eq. 2) is used to define the Neyman-Pearson (N-P) Type I error probability: P(s(X) . c a ; H 0 ) ¼ a, where c a is the critical value for significance level a. This defines the t test
where C 1 (a) denotes the rejection region and the superscripted . denotes a one-sided test in the positive direction. The N-P approach differs from that of Fisher by justifying the choice of both s(X) and C 1 (a) on optimality grounds, i.e., the choices in Eq. 3 maximize the power: a , as defined in Eq. 3, is optimal, uniformly most powerful (UMP); see Lehmann (1986) . The power of a N-P test provides a measure of its generic [for any x 2 R n ] capacity to detect different discrepancies from the null, given a.
A crucial difference between the P value and the Type I and II error probabilities is that the former is defined post-data, since it requires s(x 0 ), but the latter are defined pre-data since they only require n and the choice of a. Despite that, the P value is often viewed by practitioners as the observed significance level and recast the accept/reject rules into (Lehmann 1986) 
. a, because the data specificity of p(x 0 ) seems more informative than the dichotomous accept/reject decisions. P value and the large n problem A crucial weakness of both the P value and the N-P error probabilities is the so-called large n problem: there is always a large enough sample size n for which any simple null hypothesis. H 0 : l ¼ l 0 will be rejected by a frequentist a-significance level test; see Lindley (1957) . As argued in Spanos (2013) , there is nothing paradoxical about a small P value, or a rejection of H 0 , when n is large enough.
It is an inherent feature of a good (consistent) frequentist test, as n ! ' the power of the test p(l 1 ), for any discrepancy c 6 ¼ 0 from the null goes to one, i.e., p(l 1 ) ! n!' 1. What is fallacious is to interpret a rejection of H 0 as providing the same weight of evidence for a particular alternative H 1 , irrespective of whether n is large or small. This is an example of a more general fallacious interpretation that stems from the fact that all rejections of H 0 are viewed as providing the same weight of evidence for a particular alternative H 1 , regardless of the generic capacity (the power) of the test in question. The large n problem arises because, in light of the fact that
the power depends crucially on n; it increases with ffiffi ffi n p . This renders a rejection of H 0 with a small n (low power) very different-in evidential terms-than one with a large n (high power). Hence, the claim that ''the smaller the P value the more the evidence we have against the null hypothesis'' (Murtaugh 2013) needs to be qualified. Indeed, the real problem does not lie with the P value or the accept/reject rules as such, but with how such results are transformed into evidence for or against a hypothesis H 0 or H 1 .
The large n constitutes an example of a broader problem known as the fallacy of rejection: (mis)interpreting reject H 0 (evidence against H 0 ) as evidence for a particular H 1 ; this can arise when a test has very high power, e.g., large n. A number of attempts have been made to alleviate the large n problem, including rules of thumb for decreasing a as n increases; see Lehmann (1986) . Due to the trade-off between the Type I and II error probabilities, however, any attempt to ameliorate the problem renders the inference susceptible to the reverse fallacy known as the fallacy of acceptance: (mis)interpreting accept H 0 (no evidence against H 0 ) as evidence for H 0 ; this can easily arise when a test has very low power; e.g., a is tiny or n is too small.
These fallacies are routinely committed by practitioners in many applied fields. After numerous unsuccessful attempts, Mayo (1996) provided a reasoned answers to these fallacies in the form of a post-data severity assessment.
SEVERITY AND THE FALLACIES OF ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION
Whether data x 0 provide evidence for or against a particular hypothesis H depends crucially on the generic capacity (power) of the test to detect discrepancies from the null. This stems from the intuition that a small P value or a rejection of H 0 based on a test with low power (e.g., a small n) for detecting a particular discrepancy c provides stronger evidence for c than using a test with FORUM 646 Ecology, Vol. 95, No. 3 FORUM much higher power (e.g., a large n). This intuition is harnessed by a post-data severity evaluation of accept/ reject based on custom-tailoring the generic capacity of the test to establish the discrepancy c warranted by data x 0 ; see Mayo (1996) .
Post-data severity evaluation
The severity evaluation is a post-data appraisal of the accept/reject and P value results with a view to provide an evidential interpretation; see Mayo and Spanos (2011) . A hypothesis H (H 0 or H 1 ) ''passes'' a severe test T a with data x 0 if (i) x 0 accords with H and (ii) with very high probability, test T a would have produced a result that accords less well with H than x 0 does, if H were false (Mayo and Spanos 2006) .
The notion of severity can be used to bridge the gap between accept/reject rules and P values and an evidential interpretation in so far as the result that H passes test T a provides good evidence for inferring H (is correct) to the extent that T a severely passes H with data x 0 . The severity assessment allows one to determine whether there is evidence for (or against) inferential claims of the form l 1 ¼ l 0 þ c, for c ! 0, in terms of a discrepancy c from l 0 , which includes H 0 as well as any hypothesis belonging to the alternative parameter space l 1 . l 0 .
For the case of reject H 0 , the relevant claim is l . l 1 ¼ l 0 þ c, c ! 0, with a view to establish the largest discrepancy c from H 0 warranted by data x 0 . In this case, x 0 in condition (i) accords with H 1 , and condition (ii) concerns ''results x 2 R n that accord less well with H 1 than x 0 does.'' Hence, the severity evaluation is
where P(s(X) s(x 0 ); l l 1 ) is evaluated at l ¼ l 1 since the SEV(l , l 1 ) increases for l , l 1 . Analogously, for accept H 0 (Mayo and Spanos 2006 )
It should be emphasized that what is important for interpretation purposes is not the numerics of the tail areas, but the coherence of the underlying reasoning.
Revisiting the P value: a severity perspective To bring out a key weakness of the P value as a measure of evidence, let us relate it to the severity evaluation for reject H 0 by restricting the latter at c ¼ 0:
This suggests that, for a small P value (P ¼ 0.01), 1 À P(x 0 ) ¼ 0.99, provides a lower bound for the severity assessment of l . l 0 . Viewed from this vantage point, a small P value establishes the existence of some discrepancy c ! 0, but provides no information concerning its magnitude.
The severity evaluation remedies this weakness of the P value by taking into account the generic capacity of the test to output the magnitude of the discrepancy c warranted by data x 0 and test T a . This, however, necessitates considering alternative values of l within the same statistical model. This is because N-P testing is inherently testing within the boundaries of a statistical model, as opposed to mis-specification (M-S) testing which probes outside those boundaries, with the prespecified model representing the null; see Mayo and Spanos (2004) .
Statistical vs. substantive significance
The post-data severity evaluation in the case of reject H 0 outputs which inferential claims of the form l . l 1 are warranted (high severity) or unwarranted (low severity) on the basis of test T a and data x 0 . This provides the basis for addressing the statistical vs. substantive significance problem that has bedeviled practitioners in several fields since the 1950s. Once the warranted discrepancy c* is established, one needs to confer with substantive subject matter information to decide whether this discrepancy is substantively significant or not. Hence, not only statistical significance does not imply substantive significance, but the reverse is also true. A statistically insignificant result can implicate a substantively significant discrepancy; see Spanos (2010a) for an empirical example.
The severity perspective calls into question the use of effect size measures, based on ''distance functions'' using point estimators, as flawed attempts to evaluate the warranted discrepancy by attempting to eliminate the influence of the sample size n in an ad hoc way. Indeed, classifying effect sizes as ''small,'' ''medium,'' and ''large'' (Cumming 2011), without invoking subject matter information, seems highly questionable. In contrast, the post-severity evaluation accounts for the effect of the sample size n by taking into consideration the generic capacity of the test to output the warranted discrepancy c in a principled manner, and then lets the subject matter information make the call about substantive significance.
More generally, in addition to circumventing the fallacies of acceptance and rejection, severity can be used to address other charges like the ''arbitrariness'' of the significance level, the one-sided vs. two-sided framing of hypotheses, the reversing of the null and alternative hypotheses, the effect size problem, etc.; see Mayo and Spanos (2011) . In particular, the post-data severity evaluation addresses the initial arbitrariness of any threshold relating to the significance level or the P value by relying on the sign of s(x 0 ), and not on c a , to indicate the direction of the inferential claim that ''passed.'' Indeed, this addresses the concerns for the dichotomy created by any threshold; see Spanos (2011) .
P VALUES AND CIS
For the simple Normal model, the (1 -a) CI for l
is optimal in the sense that it has the shortest expected length. Its optimality can be demonstrated using the mathematical duality between Eq. 6 and the UMP unbiased test (Lehmann 1986 )
associated with the hypotheses H 0 : l ¼ l 0 vs. H 1 : l 6 ¼ l 0 . The mathematical duality between hypothesis testing and CIs, however, has beclouded the crucial differences between the two types of inference procedures and led to several misleading claims, like (a) CIs are more informative than tests and (b) CIs avoid most of the weaknesses of tests. As argued by Murtaugh (2013) : ''P values and confidence intervals are just different ways of summarizing the same information.'' The truth is that these two procedures pose very different questions to the data and they elicit distinct answers.
CIs vs. hypothesis testing: the underlying reasoning
The key difference between hypothesis testing and CIs is that the sampling distribution underlying Eq. 6 does not coincide with Eq. 2, but instead takes the form sðX; lÞ ¼ ffiffi ffi n p ðX n À lÞ s ; l¼lÃ Stðn À 1Þ ð 7Þ
where s(X; l) is a pivot (not a test statistic) and the evaluation does not invoke hypothetical reasoning (l ¼ l 0 ), but factual l ¼ l* (l* being the true value of l, whatever that happens to be). Hence, a more pertinent way to write Eq. 6 is
which makes explicit the underlying reasoning. This crucial difference is often obscured by blurring the distinction between the null value l 0 and the true value l* when deriving a CI by solving the acceptance region
for l 0 , and then pretending that l 0 stands, not for all its unknown values l within that interval. What makes the blurring between l 0 and the true value l* particularly elusive is that the mathematical duality ensures that under both modes of reasoning, hypothetical and factual, one is evaluating the same tail areas of St(n À 1) for hypothesis testing and CIs. What is important for interpretation purposes, however, is not the numerics of the tail areas, but the coherence of the underlying reasoning and the nature of the ensuing inferences. An important upshot of factual reasoning is that, post-data, one cannot attach a probability to the observed CI
because the post-data coverage probability is either zero or one; the factual scenario l ¼ l* has played out and OCI either includes or excludes l*. Hence, one has no way to distinguish between more likely and less likely values of l within an OCI using factual reasoning. Note that in hypothesis testing, post-data error probabilities, like the P value, are definable since the reasoning is hypothetical, and thus it applies equally post-data as well as pre-data. However, the mathematical duality enables one to use OCI as a surrogate test for two-sided hypotheses, by (illicitly) switching between the two different modes of reasoning. Ironically, practitioners in several applied fields are happy to use this mathematical duality, but ignore the fact that some of the charges leveled at the P value apply equally to CIs. For instance, the CI in Eq. 8 is equally vulnerable to the large n problem because its expected length
shrinks down to zero as n ! '; see also Murtaugh (2013) . This calls into question various claims that OCIs provide more reliable information than P values when it comes to the relevant ''effect size'' (whatever that might mean).
Observed CIs and severity
The post-data severity evaluation can be used to bring out this confusion and shed light on the issues of distinguishing between different values of l within an OCI. Hence, one cannot attach probabilities to inferential claims of the form
and l x n þ ca
because the coverage probability is rendered degenerate post-data. On the other hand, severity can be used to evaluate inferential claims of the form
Thus, in principle one can relate the observed bounds x n 6 ca 2 s ffiffi ffi n p to these inferential claims
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A moment's reflection, however, suggests that the connection between severity and the OCI is more apparent than real. This is because the reasoning underlying the severity evaluations in Eqs. 4 and 5 is hypothetical, evaluated under different values l ¼ l 1 , and not factual l ¼ l*. Indeed, the inferential claims and the relevant probabilities associated with SEV(.) in Eq. 4.7 have nothing to do with the coverage probability for l*; they pertain to the relevant inferential claims as they relate to particular discrepancies
CIs vs. hypothesis testing: questions posed
Inference procedures associated with hypothesis testing and CIs share a common objective: learn from data about the ''true'' (l ¼ l*) statistical model M * (x) ¼ ff (x;h*)g, x 2 R n yielding data x 0 . What about the questions posed?
The question posed by a CI is: How often will a random interval [L(X), U(X)] cover the true value l* of l, whatever that unknown value l* happens to be? The answer comes in the form of a (1 À a) CI using factual reasoning.
The question posed by a test is: how close is the prespecified value l 0 to l*?
The answer comes in the form of an optimal test whose capacity is calibrated using the pre-data error probabilities. A closer look at the test statistic sðXÞ ¼ ffiffi ffi n p ðX n À l 0 Þ s reveals that it is effectively a standardized distance between l* and l 0 , sinceX n is an excellent estimator of l* andx n is assumed to have been generated by M*(x).
REVISITING AKAIKE-TYPE MODEL SELECTION PROCEDURES
Akaike (1973) introduced model selection within a prespecified family
vwhich relies on minimizing a distance function based on the estimated log-likelihood (viewed as a goodnessof-fit measure) and a penalty function relating to the number of unknown parameters h i associated with each model M hi ðzÞ. The objective function is
where L(z; h i ) } f (z; h i ), h i 2 H is the likelihood function and K i is the number of unknown parameters in h i . It can be viewed as trading goodness-of-fit/prediction against parsimony (simplicity). The primary aim is to rank all the models in M(m) in terms of the estimated distance function, which is often interpreted as a metric of support; see Burnham and Anderson (2002) . In the particular case of nested regression models
the AIC takes the specific form AIC(i) ¼ n ln(r
Evaluating the AIC(i) for all i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , m, yields a ranking of the models in M(m), and the smallest is chosen.
Using goodness-of-fit/prediction as the primary criterion for ''ranking the different models,'' however, can potentially undermine the reliability of any inference in two ways. First, goodness-of-fit/prediction is neither necessary nor sufficient for statistical adequacy: the model assumptions like NIID are valid for data Z 0 . The latter ensures that the actual error probabilities approximate closely the nominal error probabilities. Applying a 0.05 significance level test when the actual Type I error is closer to 0.60 can easily lead an inference astray! Indeed, the appropriateness of particular goodness-of-fit/prediction measures, such as ln L(z;ĥ i ), is questionable when M hi ðzÞ is statistically misspecified; see Spanos (2007) .
One might object to this argument on the grounds that all inference procedures are vulnerable to statistical misspecification. Why single out Akaike-type model selection? The reason is that model validation based on thorough M-S testing to secure statistical adequacy (Mayo and Spanos 2004 ) is in direct conflict with such model selection procedures. This is because model validation will give rise to a choice of a particular model within Eq. 17 on statistical adequacy grounds, assuming Eq. 15 includes such an adequate model. This choice would render model selection procedures redundant and often misleading because the highest ranked model will rarely coincide with the statistically adequate one, largely due to the second way model selection procedures could undermine the reliability of inference. As shown below, the ranking of the different models is inferentially equivalent to N-P testing comparisons with a serious weakness: model selection procedures ignore the relevant error probabilities. If the implicit error probabilities are too low/high, that could give rise to unreliable inferences. In addition, if no statistically adequate model exists within Eq. 17, M-S testing would confirm that and no choice will be made, but model selection procedures would nevertheless indicate a highest ranked model; see Spanos (2010b) for empirical examples.
AIC vs. N-P testing
At first sight, the Akaike model selection procedure's reliance on minimizing a distance function, combining the log-likelihood and the number of unknown parameters, seems to circumvent hypothesis testing and the controversies surrounding P values and accept/reject rules. Indeed, its simplicity and apparent objectivity made it a popular procedure among practitioners. Murtaugh (2013) brings out the connections between P values, CIs, and the AIC, and argues that: ''Since P values, confidence intervals, and DAIC [difference of AIC] are based on the same statistical information, all have their places in modern statistical practice. The choice of which to use should be stylistic, dictated by details of the application rather than by dogmatic, a priori considerations. '' This argument is misleading because on closer examination, minimizing the AIC does not circumvent these problems and controversies. Although proponents of AIC generally discourage comparisons of only two models, the ranking of the different models by the AIC is inferentially equivalent to pairwise comparisons among the different models in fM hi ðzÞ, i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , mg, using N-P testing with a serious flaw: it ignores the relevant error probabilities; see Spanos (2010b) .
To illustrate the connection between the AIC ranking and N-P testing consider a particular pairwise comparison between the following two models within Eq. 15:
Let us assume that the AIC procedure selects model M 1 , i.e.,
One can relate this AIC decision in favor of M 1 to the rejection of H 0
by the F test
where c a denotes the critical value for significance level a. This suggests that the AIC procedure amounts to rejecting H 0 when F(z) . c AIC , for
! e.g., when n ¼ 100, c AIC ¼ 1.94, implying that the actual Type I error is a AIC ¼ 0.15; using a AIC , one can derive the implicit power function for the above F test. This indicates that the ranking of M 1 higher than M 0 by AIC involves a much higher significance level than the traditional ones. In this sense, the AIC implicitly allows for a much higher probability of rejecting the null when true. More generally, the implicit error probabilities associated with the AIC procedure are at best unknown, calling into question the reliability of any inferences. These results can be easily related to those in Murtaugh (2013) between DAIC and the relevant P value: P (F(Z) . F(z 0 ); H 0 ).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The paper focused primarily on certain charges, claims, and interpretations of the P value as they relate to CIs and the AIC. It as argued that some of these comparisons and claims are misleading because they ignore key differences in the procedures being compared, such as (1) their primary aims and objectives, (2) the nature of the questions posed to the data, as well as (3) the nature of their underlying reasoning and the ensuing inferences.
In the case of the P value, the crucial issue is whether Fisher's evidential interpretation of the P value as ''indicating the strength of evidence against H 0 '' is appropriate. It is argued that, despite Fisher's maligning of the Type II error, a principled way to provide an adequate evidential account, in the form of post-data severity evaluation, calls for taking into account the power of the test.
The error-statistical perspective brings out a key weakness of the P value and addresses several foundational issues raised in frequentist testing, including the fallacies of acceptance and rejection as well as misinterpretations of observed CIs; see Mayo and Spanos (2011) . The paper also uncovers the connection between model selection procedures and hypothesis testing, revealing the inherent unreliability of the former. Hence, the choice between different procedures should not be ''stylistic'' (Murtaugh 2013) , but should depend on the questions of interest, the answers sought, and the reliability of the procedures.
